We present a novel formalization of counterfactual conditionals in a quantified modal logic. Counterfactual conditionals play a vital role in ethical and moral reasoning. Prior work has shown that moral reasoning systems (and more generally, theory-of-mind reasoning systems) should be at least as expressive as first-order (quantified) modal logic (QML) to be well-behaved. While existing work on moral reasoning has focused on counterfactual-free QML moral reasoning, we present a fully specified and implemented formal system that includes counterfactual conditionals. We validate our model with two projects. In the first project, we demonstrate that our system can be used to model a complex moral principle, the doctrine of double effect. In the second project, we use the system to build a data-set with true and false counterfactuals as licensed by our theory, which we believe can be useful for other researchers. This project also shows that our model can be computationally feasible.
Introduction
Natural-language counterfactual conditionals (or simply counterfactuals) are statements that have two parts (semantically, and sometimes syntactically): an antecedent and a consequent. Counterfactual conditionals differ from standard material conditionals in that the mere falsity of the antecedent does not lead to the conditional being true. For example, the sentence "If John had gone to the doctor, John would not be sick now" is considered a counterfactual as it is usually uttered when "John has not gone to the doctor". Note that the surface syntactic form of such conditionals might not be an explicit conditional such as "If X then Y"; for example: "John going to the doctor would have prevented John being sick now". Material conditionals in classical logic fail when used to model such sentences. Counterfactuals occur in certain ethical principles and are often associated with moral reasoning. We present a formal computational model for such conditionals.
The plan for the paper is as follows. We give a brief overview of how counterfactuals are used, focusing on moral reasoning. Then we briefly discuss prior art in modeling counterfactuals, including computational studies of counterfactuals. We then present our formal system, used as a foun-Copyright c 2018, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
dation for building our model of counterfactual conditionals. After this, we present the model itself and prove some general properties of the system. We end by discussing two projects to demonstrate how the formal model can be used.
Use of Counterfactual Conditionals
Counterfactual reasoning plays a vital role in human moral reasoning. For instance, the doctrine of double effect (DDE) requires counterfactual statements in its full formalization. DDE is an attractive target for building ethical machines, as numerous empirical studies have shown that human behavior in moral dilemmas is in accordance with what the doctrine (or modified versions of it) predict. 1 Another reason for considering DDE is that many legal systems use the doctrine for defining criminality. We briefly state the doctrine below. Assume that we have an ethical hierarchy of actions as in the deontological case (e.g. forbidden, morally neutral, obligatory); see (McNamara 2010) . 2 We also assume that we have a utility or goodness function for states of the world or effects, as in the consequentialist case. Given an agent a, an action α in a situation σ at time t is said to be DDE-compliant iff (the clauses are verbatim from (Govindarajulu and Bringsjord 2017a)):
DDE Informal C1 the action is not forbidden C2 the net utility or goodness of the action is greater than some positive amount γ;
C3a the agent performing the action intends only the good effects;
C 3b the agent does not intend any of the bad effects;
C4 the bad effects are not used as a means to obtain the good effects; and
C5 if there are bad effects, the agent would rather the situation be different and the agent not have to perform the action. That is, the action is unavoidable.
Note that while (Govindarajulu and Bringsjord 2017a) present a formalization and corresponding implementation and "stopwatch" test of the first four clauses above, there is no formalization of C 5 . Work presented here will enable such a formalization. The last clause has been rewritten below to make explicit its counterfactual nature.
C5 Broken Up
C5a The agent desires that the current situation be different.
C 5b
The agent believes that if the agent itself were in a different situation, the agent would not perform the action α.
Separately, (Migliore et al. 2014) have an empirical study in which they elicit subjects to produce counterfactual answers to questions in a mix of situations with and without moral content. Their answers have the form of C 5a and C 5b . Their study shows with statistical significance that humans spent more time responding to situations that had moral content. This suggests the presence of non-trivial counterfactual reasoning in morally-charged situations.
Counterfactual reasoning also plays an important role in the intelligence community in counterfactual forecasting (Lehner 2017). In counterfacutal forecasting, analysts try to forecast what would have happened if the situation in the past was different than what we know, and as Lehner states there is a need for formal/automated tools for counterfactual reasoning.
Prior Art
Most formal modeling of counterfactuals has been in work on subjunctive conditionals. While there are varying definitions of what a subjunctive conditional is, the hallmark of such conditionals is that the antecedent, while not necessarily contrary to established facts (as is the case in counterfactuals), does speak of what could hold even if it presently doesn't; and then the consequent expresses that which would (at least supposedly) hold were this antecedent to obtain. 3 Hence, to ease exposition herein, we simply note that (i) subjunctives are assuredly non-truth-functional conditionals, and (ii) we can take subjunctive conditionals to be a superclass of counterfactual conditionals. A lively overview of formal systems for modeling subjunctive conditionals can be found in (Nute 1984) . Roughly, prior work can be divided into cotenability theories versus possible-worlds theories. In cotenability theories, a subjunctive φ > ψ holds iff (C + φ) → ψ holds. Here C is taken to be a set of laws (logical/physical/legal) cotenable with φ. One major issue with many theories of cotenability is that they at least have the appearance of circularly defining cotenability in terms of cotenability. In possible-worlds theories, semantics of subjunctive conditionals are defined in terms of possible worlds. 4 While conceptually attractive to a degree, such approaches are problematic. For example, many 3 E.g., "If you were to practice every day, your serve would be reliable" is a subjunctive conditional. It might not be the the case that you're not already practicing hard. However, "If you had practiced hard, your serve would have been reliable" is a counterfactual (because, as it's said in the literature, the antecedent is "contrary to fact"). 4 E.g., (Lewis 1973) famously aligns each possible world with an order of relative similarity among worlds, and is thereby able possible-worlds accounts are vulnerable to proofs that certain conceptions of possible worlds are provably inconsistent (e.g. see (Bringsjord 1985) ). For detailed argumentation against possible-world semantics for counterfactual conditionals, see (Ellis, Jackson, and Pargetter 1977) .
Relevance logics strive to fix issues such as explosion and non-relevance of antecedents and consequents in material conditionals; see (Mares 2014) for a wide-ranging overview. The main concern in relevance logics, as the name implies, is to ensure that there is some amount of relevance between an antecedent and a consequent of a conditional, and between the assumptions in a proof and its conclusions. Our model does not reflect this concern, as common notions of relevance such as variable/expression sharing become muddled when the system includes equality, and become even more muddled when intensionality is added. Most systems of relevance logic are primarily possibleworlds-based and share some of the same concerns we have discussed above. For example, (Mares and Fuhrmann 1995; Mares 2004 ) discuss relevance logics that can handle counterfactual conditionals but are all based on possible-worlds semantics, and the formulae are only extensional in nature. 5 Work in (Pereira and Saptawijaya 2016) falls under extensional systems, and as we explain below, is not sufficient for our modeling requirements.
Differently, recent work in natural language processing by (Son et al. 2017 ) focuses on detecting counterfactuals in social-media updates. Due to the low base rate of counterfactual statements, they use a combined rule-based and statistical method for detecting counterfactuals. Their work is on detecting (and not evaluating, analyzing further, or reasoning over) counterfactual conditionals and other counterfactual statements.
Needed Expressivity
Our modeling goals require a formal system F of adequate expressivity to be used in moral and other theoryof-mind reasoning tasks. F should be free of any consistency or soundness issues. In particular, F needs to avoid inconsistencies such as the one demonstrated below, modified from (Govindarajulu and Bringsjord 2017a). In the inference chain below, we have an agent a who knows that the murderer is the person who owns the gun. Agent a does not know that agent m is the murderer, but it's true that m is the owner of the gun. If the knowledge operator K is a simple first-order logic predicate, we get the proof shown below, which produces a contradiction from sound premises.
to capture in clever fashion the idea that a counterfactual φ > ψ holds just in case the possible world satisfying φ that is the most similar to the actual world also satisfies ψ. While as is plain we are not fans of possible-worlds semantics, those attracted to such an approach to counterfactuals would do well in our opinion to survey (Fritz and Goodman 2017) . 5 By extensional logics, we refer broadly to non-modal logics such as propositional logic, first-order logic, second-order logic etc. By intensional logics, we refer to modal logics. Note that this is different from intentions which can be represented by intensional operators, just as knowledge, belief, desires etc can be represented by intensional operators. See (Zalta 1988) for an overview.
Even more robust representation schemes can still result in such inconsistencies, or at least unsoundness, if the scheme is extensional in nature (Bringsjord and Govindarajulu 2012) . Issues such as this arise due to uniform handling of terms that refer to the same object in all contexts. This is prevented if the formal system F is a quantified modal logic (and other sufficiently expressive intensional systems). We present one such quantified modal logic below.
Background: Formal System
In this section, we present the formal system in which we model counterfactual conditionals. The formal system we use is deontic cognitive event calculus (DCEC). Arkoudas and Bringsjord (2008) introduced, for their modeling of the false-belief task, the general family of cognitive event calculi to which DCEC belongs. DCEC has been used to formalize and automate highly intensional moral reasoning processes and principles, such as akrasia (giving in to temptation that violates moral principles) (Bringsjord et al. 2014) . and the doctrine of double effect described above. 6 Briefly, DCEC is a sorted (i.e. typed) quantified modal logic (also known as sorted first-order modal logic). The calculus has a well-defined syntax and proof calculus; outlined below. The proof calculus is based on natural deduction (Gentzen 1935) , commonly used by practicing mathematicians and logicians, as well as to teach logic; the proof calculus includes all the standard introduction and elimination rules for first-order logic, as well as inference schemata for the modal operators and related structures.
Syntax
DCEC is a sorted calculus. A sorted system can be regarded analogous to a typed single-inheritance programming language. We show below some of the important sorts used in DCEC. Among these, the Agent, Action, and ActionType sorts are not native to the event calculus.
The syntax can be thought of as having two components: a first-order core and a modal system that builds upon this first-order core. The figures below show the syntax and inference schemata of DCEC. The syntax is quantified modal logic. The first-order core of DCEC is the event calculus (Mueller 2006) . Commonly used function and relation symbols of the event calculus are included. Other calculi (e.g. the situation calculus) for modeling commonsense and physical reasoning can be easly switched out in-place of the event calculus.
The modal operators present in the calculus include the standard operators for knowledge K, belief B, desire D, intention I, etc. The general format of an intensional operator is K (a, t, φ), which says that agent a knows at time t the proposition φ. Here φ can in turn be any arbitrary formula. Also, note the following modal operators: P for perceiving a state, C for common knowledge, S for agent-to-agent communication and public announcements, B for belief, D for desire, I for intention, and finally and crucially, a dyadic deontic operator O that states when an action is obligatory or forbidden for agents. It should be noted that DCEC is one specimen in a family of easily extensible cognitive calculi.
The calculus also includes a dyadic (arity = 2) deontic operator O. It is well known that the unary ought in standard deontic logic lead to contradictions. Our dyadic version of the operator blocks the standard list of such contradictions, and beyond. 7
O(a, t, φ, (¬)happens(action(a * , α), t ′ ))
Inference Schemata
The figure below shows a fragment of the inference schemata for DCEC. First-order natural deduction introduction and elimination rules are not shown. Inference schemata R K and R B let us model idealized systems that have their knowledge and beliefs closed under the DCEC proof theory. While humans are not dedcutively closed, these two rules lets us model more closely how more deliberate agents such as organizations, nations and more strategic actors reason. (Some dialects of cognitive calculi restrict the number of iterations on intensional operators.) R 4 states that knowledge of a proposition implies that the proposition holds R 13 ties intentions directly to perceptions (This model does not take into account agents that could fail to carry out their intentions). R 14 dictates how obligations get translated into known intentions.
Inference Schemata (Fragment)
Semantics
The semantics for the first-order fragment is the standard first-order semantics. The truth-functional connectives ∧, ∨, →, ¬ and quantifiers ∀, ∃ for pure first-order formulae all have the standard first-order semantics. The semantics of the modal operators differs from what is available in the so-called Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) logics (Rao and Georgeff 1991) in many important ways. For example, DCEC explicitly rejects possible-worlds semantics and model-based reasoning, instead opting for a proof-theoretic semantics and the associated type of reasoning commonly referred to as natural deduction (Gentzen 1935; Francez and Dyckhoff 2010) . Briefly, in this approach, meanings of modal operators are defined via arbitrary computations over proofs, as we will see for the counterfactual conditional below.
Reasoner (Theorem Prover)
Reasoning is performed through the first-order modal logic theorem prover, ShadowProver (Govindarajulu and Bringsjord 2017a). While we use the prover in our simulations, describing the prover in more detail is out of scope for the present paper. 8
The Formal Problem
At a time point t, we are given a set of sentences Γ describing what the system (or agent at hand) is working with. This set of sentences can be taken to describe the current state of the world at t; state of the world before t, up-to to some horizon h in the past; and also desires and beliefs about the future. We are given a counterfactual conditional φ ֒→ ψ with possibly (but not always) Γ ⊢ ¬φ. We require that our formal model provide us with the following: Required Conditions 1. Given a set of formulae Γ, and a sentence of the form φ ֒→ ψ, we should be able to tell whether or not Γ ⊢ φ ֒→ ψ.
2. Given a set of formulae Γ, and a sentence of the form Θ(a, t, φ ֒→ ψ), we should be able to tell whether or not Γ ⊢ Θ(a, t, φ ֒→ ψ), here Θ is either B, K or D. 8 The underlying first-order prover is SNARK (Stickel et al. 1994 ).
On Using the Material Conditional
If we are considering a simple material conditional φ → ψ, then if Γ ⊢ ¬φ, then trivially Γ ⊢ φ → ψ, if the proof calculus subsumes standard propositional logic ⊢ Prop , as is is the case with logics used in moral reasoning. Another issue is that whether Γ ⊢ (φ ֒→ ψ) holds is not simply a function of whether Γ ⊢ φ holds and Γ ⊢ ψ holds, that is ֒→ is not a truth-functional connective, unlike the material conditional →.
Modeling Counterfactual Conditionals
The general intuition is that given φ ֒→ ψ, one has to drop some of the formulae in Γ arriving at Γ ′ and then if (Γ+φ) ⊢ ψ, we can conclude that φ ֒→ ψ. More precisely, φ ֒→ ψ can be proven from Γ iff there is a subset Γ ′ of Γ consistent with φ such that (Γ ′ + φ) ⊢ ψ. Since we are using a natural deduction proof calculus, we need to specify introduction and elimination rules for ֒→. Let Cons[Φ] denote that a set of formulae Φ is consistent.
Extensional Context
The elimination rule for ֒→ is much simpler and resembles the rule for the material conditional →.
Intensional Context
The inference schema given below apply to the presence of the counterfactual in any arbitrary context Υ. The context for a formula is defined as below. Let denote the empty list and let ⊕ denote list concatentation.
For example, Υ[B(a, t 1 , K(b, t 2 , P ))] = a, t 1 , b, t 2 With the context defined as above, inference schemata for ֒→ occurring within a modal context is given below.
The elimination rule for ֒→ under any arbitrary context is given below.
For a simple example of the above rules, see the experiments sections below.
A Note on Implementing the Introduction Rules
There are two possible dynamic programming algorithms. In the worst case, both the algorithms amount to searching over all possible subsets of a given Γ. In the first algorithm, we start from smaller subsets and compute whether (Γ ′ + φ) ⊢ ψ and Cons[Γ ′ + φ]. For any larger sets Γ ′′ , (Γ ′′ + φ) ⊢ ψ need not be computed. In the second algorithm, we start with larger subsets and compute (Γ ′′ + φ) ⊢ ψ and Cons[Γ ′′ + φ]. For any smaller sets Γ ′ , Cons[Γ ′ + φ] need not be computed. If ⊢ is first-order and above, the second algorithm is preferable. If ⊢ encompasses first-order logic, then computing Cons[Φ] for any set is hard in the general case. In our implementation, we approximate Cons[Φ] by running querying a prover for Φ ⊢ ⊥ up to a time limit δ. As δ increases, the approximation becomes better.
Properties of the System
Now we canvass some meta-theorems about the system. All the four inference schemata given above, when added to a monotonic proof theory, preserve monotonicity.
Theorem 1: Monotonicity Preservation
If ⊢ is monotonic, then ⊢ augmented with R cf 1 , R cf 2 , R cf 3 , and R cf 4 is still monotonic.
Proof Sketch: Notice that the right-hand side of the condition for the introduction rules stay satisfied if we replace Γ with a superset Φ. The elimination rules hold regardless of Γ.
We assume that ⊢ is monotonic. For monotonic systems, for any Γ ′ ⊆ Γ, Cons[Γ] ⇒ Cons[Γ ′ ]. We show that some desirable properties that hold for other systems in the literature hold for the system presented here. 
Proof: Given Γ ⊢ (¬ψ) ֒→ ψ, therefore using ֒→ -elim Γ + ¬ψ ⊢ ψ, and using ¬-elim we have Γ ⊢ ψ, giving us
Assume Γ ⊢ (φ → χ). We need to prove Γ ⊢ (ψ → χ).
Since we are given Γ ⊢ ψ ֒→ φ, either ¬Cons [{ψ}] or there is a Γ ′ ⊆ Γ such that Cons[Γ ′ + ψ] and Γ ′ + ψ ⊢ φ. If the former holds, we are finished. If the latter holds, we then have Γ + ψ ⊢ φ since ⊢ is monotonic. Using the given Γ ⊢ (φ → χ) and the → −elimination rule, we obtain Γ+ψ ⊢ χ. Therefore, Γ ⊢ ψ → χ.
Proof: We establish the left-to-right direction of the biconditional 
Proof: Similar to the previous proof, we prove the left-toqright direction of the biconditional 
The next property states that if we are given φ ֒→ ψ 1 and φ ֒→ ψ 2 , we can reach φ ֒→ ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 . For instance, "If a had gone to the doctor, a would not have been sick" and "If a had gone to the doctor, a would be happy now" give us "If a had gone to the doctor, a would not have been sick and a would be happy now".
Proof: If ¬Cons[φ] we are done. If not, we must find a Γ ′ that satisfies I 1 , I 2 , and I 3 . Given that Cons[φ], there is a Γ φ corresponding to the two conditionals that are given to hold. I 1 and I 2 hold since the conditions remain the same. I 3 holds as Γ φ ⊢ ψ 1 and Γ φ ⊢ ψ 2 imply that Γ φ ⊢ ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 through ∧−introduction.
One property which has been problematic for many previous formal systems is simplification of disjunctive antecedents (SDA). For instance, given "If a had gone to the doctor or if a had taken medication, a would not be sick now" should give us "If a had gone to the doctor, a would not be sick now, and if a had taken medication, a would not be sick now." Logics based on possible worlds find it quite challenging to handle this property -yet it seems like a necessary property to secure (Ellis, Jackson, and Pargetter 1977) , though there are some disagreements on this front (Loewer 1976) . As a middle ground we can prove "If a had gone to the doctor, a would not be sick now, or if a had taken medication, a would not be sick now."
, we have ¬Cons[φ 1 ] and ¬Cons[φ 2 ], we then reach our conclusion. Otherwise, if Cons[φ 1 ∨ φ 2 ], then there is a Γ φ1∨φ2 serving as Γ ′ . We need to prove three clauses:
(1) I 1 is satisfied as Γ ′ = Γ φ1∨φ2 .
(
, then I 2 is satisfied for either φ 1 ֒→ ψ or φ 2 ֒→ ψ. Assume that it holds for the former.
With stronger assumptions we can obtain a property that directly resembles SDA.
Property 11
If Γ ⊢ (φ1 ∨ φ2) ֒→ ψ and Γ ⊢ ¬φ1 and Γ ⊢ ¬φ2
Proof: The proof is similar to the previous proof, needing only minor modifications.
Property 12, A4 in (Pollock 1976) Finally, we have the following theorem, the proof of which can be obtained by exploiting all the properties above.
Theorem 2
All the above properties hold if every counterfactual φ ֒→ ψ is replaced by Υ[φ ֒→ ψ].
Given the above, we can prove the following, using rules R 4 and R 14 . The following theorem gives an account of how an agent might assert a counterfactual conditional in a moral/ethical situation.
Experiments
We describe two experiments that demonstrate the model in action, the first in moral dilemmas and the second in general situations. 9
Counterfactual Conditionals in Moral Dilemmas
We look at moral dilemmas used in (Govindarajulu and Bringsjord 2017a). Each dilemma d has an axiomatization Γ d . Two such dilemmas are axiomatized and studied in (Govindarajulu and Bringsjord 2017a) . Assume that an agent a is facing a given dilemma d. The axiomatization Γ d includes a's knowledge and beliefs about the dilemma. We show that for each d, we can get C 5a and C 5b . Note that C 5a and C 5b talk about situations. Though event calculus does not directly model situations, we can use fluents to do so. A situation is formalized as an object of sort Situation:
We have the following additional symbols that tell us when an agent is in a situation and what actions are possible for an agent in a situation at a given time:
We have the following axiom which states that the only actions that an agent can perform in a situation at a time are those sanctioned by the Action predicate.
∀a : Agent, α : ActionType, t : Moment. As a warmup to C 5b , we state C 5a below. Let the current agent be I and time be denoted by t. The formula below states that the agent believes it is in a situation σ ′ and desires to be in a situation σ ′ different from σ with at least one action type α that is not forbidden and does not have any negative effects. 10 Here µ : Fluent → R denotes the total utility of a fluent for all agents and all times.
Let α D be the DDE-complaint action that the agent is saddled with in the current situation σ. Let Θ(σ, t) be the inner statement in the desires modal operator above. The statement below formalizes C 5b and can be read as the agent believing that if the agent were in a different situation with at 9 Axioms for both the experiments, data and the reasoning system can be obtained here: https://goo.gl/nDZtWX 10 Note that this is a mere first formulation of a complex mental state and further refinements, simple and drastic, are possible and expected. least one action that is not forbidden and does not have any negative effects, it would then not perform the action α D required of it by DDE.
Formalization of C 5b
B I, t, Θ(σ, t) ֒→ ¬happens action(I, αD), t + 1
We derive the above two conditions from: (1) axioms describing situations; and (2) common knowledge C(Φ) dictating that agents should only perform non-forbidden actions and in a non-dilemma situation will peform an action with only positive effects. C 5a takes around 780ms and C 5b takes around 8.378s.
Evaluation of the System
We demonstrate the feasibility of our system by showing the model working for a small dataset of representative problems. There are 16 problems each with its own set of assumptions Γ. For each problem Γ, we have a statement that is provably counterfactual, that is Γ ⊢ ¬φ. Using this statement, we build three conditionals: (1) a counterfactual conditional φ ֒→ ψ; (2) an absurd material conditional φ → ⊥; and (3) an absurd counterfactual φ ֒→ ⊥. The number of premises range from 2 to 15. One simple problem is shown below: The table below shows how much time proving the true and false counterfactuals takes when compared with proving the absurd material conditional for the same problem. As expected, the counterfactual conditional takes more time than the material conditional. The absurd counterfactual φ ֒→ ⊥ is merely intended as a sanity check and the large reasoning times are expected (mainly due to timeouts), and is not expected to be a common use case. 
Conclusion & Future Work
We have presented a novel formal model for counterfactual conditionals. We have applied this model to complete a formalization of an important ethical principle, the doctrine of double effect. We have also provided an implementation of a reasoning system and a dataset with counterfactual conditionals. There are three main threads for future work. First, the reasoning algorithm is quite simple and can be improved by looking at either hand-built or learned heuristics. Second, we hope to leverage recent work in developing an uncertainty system for a cognitive calculus (Govindarajulu and Bringsjord 2017b). Finally, we hope to build a more robust and extensive dataset of counterfactual reasoning validated by multiple judgements from humans.
